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Disjunctive Effects and the Logic of Causation
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Journal Article
Disjunctive Effects and the Logic of Causation
2014
Overview
We argue in favor of merely disjunctive effects, namely cases in which an event or fact, C, is not a cause of an effect, E₁, and is also not a cause of a distinct effect, E₂, and yet C is a cause of the disjunctive effect (E₁ or E₂). Disjunctive effects let us retain the additivity and the distributivity of causation. According to additivity, if C is a cause of E₁ and C is a cause of E₂, then C is a cause of E₁ and E₂. According to distributivity, if C is a cause of E₁ and E₂, then C is a cause of E₁ and C is a cause of E₂. We draw an analogy between causation and intensional notions like believing, wanting, and owing, which also admit of merely disjunctive cases. We argue that both the Lewisian counterfactual account of causation (including its recent emendation by Sartorio) and the contrastive account of causation fail to properly account for this phenomenon.
