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Making Policy Stick: Why the Government Gets What It Wants in Multiparty Parliaments
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Journal Article
Making Policy Stick: Why the Government Gets What It Wants in Multiparty Parliaments
2001
Overview
The ability of multiparty coalitions to make policy is a puzzle. However closely they agree on policy, at election time parties compete against each other for a limited pool of votes. Since legislative alliances blur differences between parties, the ubiquity of party competition begs the question of what holds coalitions together to pass laws. Recent work by Huber (1996a) and others highlights the Prime Minister's ability to use the vote of confidence to keep rebellious coalition members in line. Attaching confidence to bills can be problematic, however, even suicidal under some circumstances. I argue that the authority to offer legislative amendments late in the process, when no one else can, protects the Minister in whose jurisdiction a bill falls. This \"last-offer\" authority holds enacting coalitions together and allows the Minister both to limit her losses from hostile amendments and use policy outcomes to punish parties that stray from the coalition fold.
Publisher
University of Wisconsin Press,Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Subject
