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International joint venture, commitment and host-country policy in an integrated market
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International joint venture, commitment and host-country policy in an integrated market
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Journal Article
International joint venture, commitment and host-country policy in an integrated market
2010
Overview
To highlight the importance of bargaining power for both host and foreign partners, we envisage two modes, commitment and no-commitment, respectively, to examine the issue on international joint venture (IJV)’s profit-splitting and optimal host-country policy in an integrated market. With a three-stage Nash bargaining model, it turns out that in an integrated market, tax rate under commitment does not exactly equal zero unless the host partner does not benefit at all in terms of production efficiency by the IJV. Government shall subsidize joint venture while the host partner has more bargaining power than the foreign partner. Furthermore, subsidy is the optimal policy under no-commitment.
Publisher
Springer-Verlag,Springer,Springer Nature B.V
