Journal Article

Dangerous Disconnect

Rosenzweig, Steven C.

2021

Overview

Why do politicians use violence as an electoral tactic, and how does it affect voting behavior? Theories of election-related violence focus on the electoral benefits such violence is said to provide, relying on the assumption that when parties and candidates employ violence, they do so based on an accurate assessment of its relative costs and benefits. Far less attention has been paid to the costs of violence as an electoral tactic, including the potential for voter backlash against it. This study provides evidence that voter backlash against violence is more significant than both scholars and politicians tend to assume. Moreover, that backlash can diminish the electoral advantages that violence provides. Combining survey experiments with Kenyan voters and observational data on violence and election outcomes, I find compelling evidence for broad-based voter backlash against violence that undermines its effectiveness as an electoral tactic. At the same time, data from parallel survey experiments and qualitative interviews with Kenyan politicians demonstrate that they underestimate the extent to which violence diminishes their support among voters. The results highlight the often underappreciated costs of violence as an electoral tactic and the role that elite misperceptions can play in its persistence.

• Publisher: Springer Science + Business Media,Springer US,Springer Nature B.V
• Subject: Candidates / Costs / Elections / Elites / Experiments / ORIGINAL PAPER / Political campaigns / Political Science / Political Science and International Relations / Political Science and International Studies / Politicians / Polls & surveys / Sociology / Violence / Voter behavior / Voters / Voting