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Making Clientelism Work: How Norms of Reciprocity Increase Voter Compliance
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Making Clientelism Work: How Norms of Reciprocity Increase Voter Compliance
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Journal Article
Making Clientelism Work: How Norms of Reciprocity Increase Voter Compliance
2014
Overview
Recent research on clientelism focuses on mercenary exchanges between voters and brokers. In this \"instrumentalist\" view, machine politics is only sustainable where patrons can punish clients for defection-a situation that does not apply in many places known for clientelism.
We build a different theory of clientelism around the norm of reciprocity. If exchanges rely on clients' feelings of obligation to return favors to their patrons, then clientelism can be sustained even where the ballot is genuinely secret. To support this argument, we draw on a range of research,
including a series of split-sample experiments embedded in two surveys on Mexico specifically focused on reciprocity. Our findings have implications for voting behavior, party organization, and the types of public policies that may prevent clientelism.
Publisher
City University of New York,The City University of New York
