Asset Details
Do you wish to reserve the book?
New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness
Do you wish to request the book?
New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness
2024
Overview
We provide novel representations of strategy-proof voting rules applicable when voters have uni-dimensional single-peaked preferences. In particular, we introduce a ‘grading curve’ representation which is particularly useful when introducing variable electorates. Our analysis recovers, links and unifies existing results in the literature, and provides new characterizations when strategy-proofness is combined with other desirable properties such as ordinality, participation, consistency, and proportionality. Finally, the new representations are used to compute the strategy-proof methods that maximize the ex-ante social welfare for the
L
2
-norm and a uniform prior. The resulting strategy-proof welfare maximizer is the linear median (or ‘uniform median’), that we also characterize as the unique proportional strategy-proof voting rule.
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg,Springer,Springer Verlag
