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Measuring Bias in Consumer Lending
by
PARAVISINI, DANIEL
, LIBERMAN, ANDRES
, DOBBIE, WILL
, PATHANIA, VIKRAM
in
Applicants
/ Bias
/ Examiners
/ Immigrants
/ Incentives
/ Principal-agent models
/ Profitability
/ Profits
2021
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Do you wish to request the book?
Measuring Bias in Consumer Lending
by
PARAVISINI, DANIEL
, LIBERMAN, ANDRES
, DOBBIE, WILL
, PATHANIA, VIKRAM
in
Applicants
/ Bias
/ Examiners
/ Immigrants
/ Incentives
/ Principal-agent models
/ Profitability
/ Profits
2021
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Journal Article
Measuring Bias in Consumer Lending
2021
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Overview
This article tests for bias in consumer lending using administrative data from a high-cost lender in the U.K. We motivate our analysis using a new principal-agent model of bias where loan examiners are incentivized to maximize a short-term outcome, not long-term profits, leading to bias against illiquid applicants at the margin of loan decisions. We identify the profitability of marginal applicants using the quasi-random assignment of loan examiners, finding significant bias against immigrant and older applicants when using the firm’s preferred measure of long-run profits but not when using the short-run measure used to evaluate examiner performance. In this case, market incentives based on characteristics that vary across groups lead to inefficient group-based bias.
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Subject
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