Journal Article

The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective

Rietveld, Erik, Bruineberg, Jelle, Kiverstein, Julian

2018

Overview

In this paper, we argue for a theoretical separation of the free-energy principle from Helmholtzian accounts of the predictive brain. The free-energy principle is a theoretical framework capturing the imperative for biological self-organization in information-theoretic terms. The free-energy principle has typically been connected with a Bayesian theory of predictive coding, and the latter is often taken to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception as unconscious inference. If our interpretation is right, however, a Helmholtzian view of perception is incompatible with Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle. We argue that the free energy principle and the ecological and enactive approach to mind and life make for a much happier marriage of ideas. We make our argument based on three points. First we argue that the free energy principle applies to the whole animal-environment system, and not only to the brain. Second, we show that active inference, as understood by the free-energy principle, is incompatible with unconscious inference understood as analagous to scientific hypothesis-testing, the main tenet of a Helmholtzian view of perception. Third, we argue that the notion of inference at work in Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle is too weak to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception. Taken together these points imply that the free energy principle is best understood in ecological and enactive terms set out in this paper.

• Publisher: Springer,Springer Netherlands,Springer Nature B.V
• Subject: Brain / Education / Energy / Epistemology / Inference / Information theory / Logic / Meta-analysis / Metaphysics / Perceptions / Philosophy / Philosophy of Language / Philosophy of mind / Philosophy of Science / Predictive control / S.I.: Predictive Brains