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Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000
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Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000
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Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000
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Journal Article
Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000
2008
Overview
We present strong evidence that governing coalitions in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers. First, governing parties have a roll rate that is nearly 0, and their roll rate is lower than opposition parties' roll rates, which average about 20% on all final-passage votes. Second, after one controls for distance from the floor median, opposition parties have higher roll rates than government parties. These results strongly suggest that governing parties in Italy are able to control the legislative agenda to their benefit. We also document significantly higher opposition roll rates on decree-conversion bills and budget bills than on ordinary bills—results consistent with our theoretical analysis of the differing procedures used in each case.
Publisher
Blackwell Publishing Ltd,Comparative Legislative Research Center of the University of Iowa
Subject
