Asset Details
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Making Law: Small-Scale Trade and Corrupt Exceptions at the Vietnam–China Border
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Making Law: Small-Scale Trade and Corrupt Exceptions at the Vietnam–China Border
Do you wish to request the book?
Making Law: Small-Scale Trade and Corrupt Exceptions at the Vietnam–China Border
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
Making Law: Small-Scale Trade and Corrupt Exceptions at the Vietnam–China Border
2014
Overview
In Vietnam's postreform era, the proliferation of profiteering opportunities have, in addition to creating new forms of corruption, transmuted previously prevailing types of corrupt acts in multiple ways across different levels of state–society relations. Everyday corrupt practices have thus become an essential means of economic survival for many. Starting from the metaphorical framing of petty bribery as \"making law,\" I propose the notion of what I term \"corrupt exception\" as a conceptual tool to explore the power dynamics of petty corruption between state agents and small-scale traders at the Vietnam–China border. Whereas bribery is felt by local traders to create better profit opportunities, the corrupt exception likewise pushes them into a de facto illegality where they remain subjected to arbitrary \"lawmaking\" and excluded from legal protection. I show that the metaphors employed by small-scale traders to negotiate complicit relationships with corrupt state officials both contest and reinforce the exercise of a localized form of sovereign power in a permanent state of corrupt exception in which \"law\" is \"made\" in exchange for bribes. A través de los distintos niveles de las relaciones Estado-sociedad en la era post-reforma de Vietnam, la proliferación de oportunidades de beneficio ha transformado en múltiples maneras las formas de corrupción anteriormente prevalecientes, al tiempo que han surgido nuevos tipos de actos corruptos. Así, las prácticas cotidianas de corrupción han devenido un medio esencial de subsistencia económica para muchos. A través de la interpretación metafórica de la pequeña corrupción como \"hacer ley,\" propongo el término \"excepción corrupta\" como una herramienta conceptual para explorar las dinámicas de poder de la pequeña corrupción en la frontera entre Vietnam y China. Al tiempo que el soborno es percibido por los comerciantes locales como una herramienta para crear mejores oportunidades de beneficio, la excepción corrupta los conduce a una ilegalidad de facto dentro de cuyo marco dichos comerciantes permanecen sujetos a un \"hacer ley\" arbitrario y, por lo tanto, los excluye de cualquier protección legal. En este artículo muestro que las metáforas utilizadas por los pequeños comerciantes para negociar una complicidad compartida con los oficiales estatales corruptos, desafían, al tiempo que refuerzan, el ejercicio de un poder soberano localizado en un permanente estado de excepción corrupta donde \"la ley\" es \"hecha\" en el intercambio de los sobornos.
