Asset Details
MbrlCatalogueTitleDetail
Do you wish to reserve the book?
The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals
by
Thorn Kring
, Danilov, Anastasia
, Biemann, Torsten
, Sliwka, Dirk
in
Incentives
2012
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
You are currently in the queue to collect this book. You will be notified once it is your turn to collect the book.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Oops! Something went wrong.
While trying to remove the title from your shelf something went wrong :( Kindly try again later!
Do you wish to request the book?
The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals
by
Thorn Kring
, Danilov, Anastasia
, Biemann, Torsten
, Sliwka, Dirk
in
Incentives
2012
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals
Paper
The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals
2012
Request Book From Autostore
and Choose the Collection Method
Overview
In an experiment with professionals from the financial services sector, we investigate the impact of a team incentive scheme on recommendation quality of investment products when advisors benefit from advising lower quality products. Experimental results reveal that, when group affiliation is strong, worse products are recommended significantly more often under team incentives than under individual incentives.
Publisher
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Subject
This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website.