Journal Article

Political Moralism and Constitutional Reasoning: A Reply to Bernard Williams

Mann, Roni

2021

Overview

Williams’s well-known critique of the ‘moralism’ of liberal political philosophy—its disconnect from political reality—holds special significance for the theory and practice of constitutional adjudication, where calls for ‘realism’ increasingly resound. Is constitutional discourse also guilty of moralism—as Williams himself thought—or might it succeed where political philosophy has failed? This paper reconstructs Williams’s critique of political moralism as one that decries the empty idealism of the philosophical project of abstraction: the quest for general, timeless, and universal principles drains theory of its prescriptive force. It then argues that legal-constitutional reasoning, even in its most ambitious ‘forum of principle’ conception, is not a flight to abstraction but precisely a pragmatist negotiation of the concreteness-abstraction tension through acts of justification. But constitutional discourse in its current form remains moralistic in another distinct sense: it idealizes the political, thereby failing to account for the social and political pressures on courts and the proper normative significance of institutional considerations. Constitutional discourse could only offer a solution to the ailments of political philosophy if it cures its own chronic idealization.

• Publisher: Springer Nature B.V
• Subject: Ambition / Constitutional law / Constitutions / Courts / Discourse / Dworkin, Ronald / Epistemology / Idealism / Idealization / Justification / Legitimacy / Morality / Negotiation / Philosophy / Political discourse / Political philosophy / Political science / Politics / Realism / Reasoning / Reflective practice / Williams, Bernard