Asset Details
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?
Do you wish to request the book?
Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?
1991
Overview
In this Article, Einer Elhauge analyzes whether interest group theory justifies various proposals to change constitutional review, antitrust law, or statutory interpretation in order to make courts less deferential to the political process. He begins by demonstrating that interest group theory cannot identify instances where interest group influence is disproportionate without using implicit normative baselines that reflect substantive conclusions about the merits of political outcomes. Because such substantive conclusions are contestable, he concludes that interest group theory can provide no reliable grounds for collective condemnation of the political process. He then argues that, even if one stipulates a normative baseline, interest group theory does not demonstrate that the litigation process has a comparative advantage over the political process. Nor can one justify more intrusive judicial review on the ground that it increases the transaction costs of interest group capture. More intrusive judicial review can sometimes decrease such transaction costs, and increasing transaction costs can perversely encourage interest group activity, increase the relative advantage of interest groups, and retard legal changes that benefit the general public. In a final section, the Article offers parallel reasons for rejecting the claim that decision theory also justifies more intrusive judicial review.
