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Party Government and the \Cohesive Power of Public Plunder\
by
Kim, Henry A.
, Carroll, Royce
in
20th century
/ Benefits
/ Coalitions
/ Committees
/ Congressional committees
/ Congressional voting
/ Distribution
/ Expenditures
/ Government
/ Government policy
/ Government spending
/ Incentives
/ Legislative Bodies
/ Legislative power
/ Legislators
/ Legislatures
/ Policy analysis
/ Policy making
/ Political institutions
/ Political majority
/ Political Parties
/ Political partisanship
/ Political power
/ Political science
/ Political systems
/ Pork
/ Power
/ Recent political history
/ Theory
/ U.S.A
/ United States of America
/ Upper chamber
/ Voting
2010
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Party Government and the \Cohesive Power of Public Plunder\
by
Kim, Henry A.
, Carroll, Royce
in
20th century
/ Benefits
/ Coalitions
/ Committees
/ Congressional committees
/ Congressional voting
/ Distribution
/ Expenditures
/ Government
/ Government policy
/ Government spending
/ Incentives
/ Legislative Bodies
/ Legislative power
/ Legislators
/ Legislatures
/ Policy analysis
/ Policy making
/ Political institutions
/ Political majority
/ Political Parties
/ Political partisanship
/ Political power
/ Political science
/ Political systems
/ Pork
/ Power
/ Recent political history
/ Theory
/ U.S.A
/ United States of America
/ Upper chamber
/ Voting
2010
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Do you wish to request the book?
Party Government and the \Cohesive Power of Public Plunder\
by
Kim, Henry A.
, Carroll, Royce
in
20th century
/ Benefits
/ Coalitions
/ Committees
/ Congressional committees
/ Congressional voting
/ Distribution
/ Expenditures
/ Government
/ Government policy
/ Government spending
/ Incentives
/ Legislative Bodies
/ Legislative power
/ Legislators
/ Legislatures
/ Policy analysis
/ Policy making
/ Political institutions
/ Political majority
/ Political Parties
/ Political partisanship
/ Political power
/ Political science
/ Political systems
/ Pork
/ Power
/ Recent political history
/ Theory
/ U.S.A
/ United States of America
/ Upper chamber
/ Voting
2010
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Party Government and the \Cohesive Power of Public Plunder\
Journal Article
Party Government and the \Cohesive Power of Public Plunder\
2010
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Overview
We argue that party government in the U.S. House of Representatives rests on two pillars: the pursuit of policy goals and the disbursement of particularistic benefits. Existing theories of party government argue that the majority party in the House is often successful in biasing policy outcomes in its favor. In the process, it creates \"policy losers\" among its own members who nevertheless support their party on procedural votes. We posit that the majority party cretes an incentive for even the policy losers to support a procedural coalition through judicious distribution of particularistic benefits that compensates policy losers at a rate commensurate with the policy losses that they suffer. We evaluate our theory empirically using the concept of \"roll rates\" in conjunction with federal domestic outlays data for the period 1983-96. We find that, within the majority party, policy losers are favored in the distribution of \"pork barrel\" spending throughout this period.
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