Asset Details
Do you wish to reserve the book?
Experienced vs. Described Uncertainty: Do We Need Two Prospect Theory Specifications?
Hey, we have placed the reservation for you!
By the way, why not check out events that you can attend while you pick your title.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place the reservation. Kindly try again later.
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
Experienced vs. Described Uncertainty: Do We Need Two Prospect Theory Specifications?
Do you wish to request the book?
Experienced vs. Described Uncertainty: Do We Need Two Prospect Theory Specifications?
Please be aware that the book you have requested cannot be checked out. If you would like to checkout this book, you can reserve another copy
We have requested the book for you!
Your request is successful and it will be processed during the Library working hours. Please check the status of your request in My Requests.
Oops! Something went wrong.
Looks like we were not able to place your request. Kindly try again later.
Journal Article
Experienced vs. Described Uncertainty: Do We Need Two Prospect Theory Specifications?
2011
Overview
This paper reports on the results of an experimental elicitation at the individual level of all prospect theory components (i.e., utility, loss aversion, and weighting functions) in two decision contexts: situations where alternatives are described as probability distributions and situations where the decision maker must experience unknown probability distributions through sampling before choice. For description-based decisions, our results are fully consistent with prospect theory's empirical findings under risk. Furthermore, no significant differences are detected across contexts as regards utility and loss aversion. Whereas decision weights exhibit similar qualitative properties across contexts typically found under prospect theory, our data suggest that, for gains at least, the subjective treatment of uncertainty in experience-based and description-based decisions is significantly different. More specifically, we observe a less pronounced overweighting of small probabilities and a more pronounced underweighting of moderate and high probabilities for experience-based decisions. On the contrary, for losses, no significant differences were observed in the evaluation of prospects across contexts.
This paper was accepted by George Wu, decision analysis.
Publisher
INFORMS,Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
Subject
/ Context
/ Decision theory. Utility theory
/ Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit
/ Exact sciences and technology
/ Humanities and Social Sciences
/ Loss
/ Operational research and scientific management
/ Operational research. Management science
/ Property
/ risk
/ Sampling
/ Sampling theory, sample surveys
/ Sciences and techniques of general use
/ Studies
/ Theory
/ utility
