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The Distinctiveness of Second-Person Mental Attributions: (A Comment on D.I. Pérez and A. Gomila, Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction, Routledge, 2021)
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The Distinctiveness of Second-Person Mental Attributions: (A Comment on D.I. Pérez and A. Gomila, Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction, Routledge, 2021)
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Journal Article
The Distinctiveness of Second-Person Mental Attributions: (A Comment on D.I. Pérez and A. Gomila, Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction, Routledge, 2021)
2022
Overview
In Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction (2021), Routledge, Diana
Pérez and Antoni Gomila articulate a complex web of conceptual and empirical
explorations that altogether make a remarkable case for the primitiveness and
distinctiveness of second-person mental attributions. I find their case for the
primitiveness of second-person attributions quite convincing and deeply rooted in their
philosophical project, whose specific nature I will examine in the first section. The rest of
the paper will then focus on their case for the distinctiveness of those mental attributions
that are made in second- person interactions. My conclusion will be that Pérez and
Gomila's various strategies to motivate the distinctiveness of such attributions are
ultimately unsatisfactory.
En Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction (2021), Routledge, Diana
Pérez y Antoni Gomila articulan una compleja red de exploraciones conceptuales y
empíricas que, en su conjunto, constituyen una noble defensa del carácter primitivo y
distintivo de las atribuciones mentales de segunda persona. Encuentro que su defensa de
la primitividad de las atribuciones de segunda persona es muy convincente y está
profundamente enraizada su proyecto filosófico, cuya naturaleza específica analizaré en la
primera sección. El resto del artículo se centrará en su defensa de la distintividad de
aquellas atribuciones mentales que se hacen en las interacciones de segunda persona. Mi
conclusión será que las diferentes estrategias de Pérez y Gomila para motivar la
distintividad de tales atribuciones son, en última instancia, insatisfactorias.
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