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Russian preferred self-image and the two Chechen wars
Russian preferred self-image and the two Chechen wars
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Russian preferred self-image and the two Chechen wars
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Russian preferred self-image and the two Chechen wars
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Russian preferred self-image and the two Chechen wars
Russian preferred self-image and the two Chechen wars
Journal Article

Russian preferred self-image and the two Chechen wars

2003
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Overview
From Yeltsin's announcement in December 1994 that Russian troops would wage a \"small victorious war\" in Chechnya to \"restore constitutional order\" to Putin's promise in October of 1999 to \"corner the bandits in the ... house and rub them out,\" 1 and throughout two wars, the self-image of the Russian Federation has been profoundly linked to its ability to deal with the situation in Chechnya. Michael Urban has argued that the re-creation of post-Soviet national communities has taken place largely through two moments: one, a positive moment, rehabilitates national \"markers\" of culture (for example, \"bourgeois\" Russian theater) that were suppressed during the communist era; the other, a negative moment, is effected by cleansing the nation of symbols, such as statues of Stalin, that were imposed by communist oppressors. In Russia, the re-creation of a post-Soviet national community has been complicated by the impossibility of blaming someone else for the imposition of communist rule and its continuing harmful consequences for economic and political development. The torturous nature of identity-formation in Russia has contributed to a situation in which everyday political conflict, bargaining, and compromise \"easily becomes entangled with the intractable issue of identity.\" 2 The powers of a Russian president under the 1993 constitution were unconstrained by Western democratic standards. He could issue his own decrees, which had the force of law throughout the Federation; 6 he headed the armed forces; 7 he could declare a state of war as well as a state of emergency; and the balance between various branches of the government heavily favored him. 8 Yeltsin made several crucial decisions through decree instead of consulting the Duma, and when he did rely on the advice of others, it was often that of the \"war party.\" 9 Western critics saw the war party's rise to power in the Kremlin as confirming the dangers of the \"super-presidentialism\" encoded in Yeltsin's 1993 constitution. The Russian press hardly dealt with the problems of \"super-presidentialism,\" although there were frequent articles about Yeltsin-the-man and the need to find a balance between having a strong president and a dictator. 10 The prominence of anxieties about a \"return to the past\" and the difficulties of forming a positive national identity when the nation's leader--Yeltsin--was so inconstant, underlay many discussions about Yeltsin's capacities for conducting a full-scale military operation in Chechnya. The construction of an image of Russia as benevolent and strong demands active \"tinkering\" with the presentation of the war to the Russian public. Under Yeltsin and [Vladimir Putin], deflecting anxieties about the Russian Federation onto Chechnya became part of the process of identity formation. For example, apprehensions about crime in Russia are diverted when politicians call Chechnya \"lawless\" and promise to \"restore order\" there. In the second war, journalists and intellectuals who called attention to aspects of the war that contradicted Russians' preferred image of well-organized Russian troops fighting a defensive and morally justified war were shamed as \"unpatriotic traitors.\" \"Unpatriotic\" was applied so often and in so many cases--to publicizing \"ugly\" facts about the war, calling for an end to the fighting rather than victory, and approving of international mediation rather than relying on Russian governmental bodies--that one could clearly trace a trend to conflate patriotism with an optimistic outlook for the second war in Chechnya. 55 Optimism and \"pragmatic patriotism\" have therefore become an integral part of Russian identity-formation in the Putin era. 56