Journal Article

Strategic Opposition and Government Cohesion in Westminster Democracies

SPIRLING, ARTHUR, DEWAN, TORUN

2011

Overview

Cohesive government-versus-opposition voting is a robust empirical regularity in Westminster democracies. Using new data from the modern Scottish Parliament, we show that this pattern cannot be explained by similarity of preferences within or between the government and opposition ranks. We look at differences in the way that parties operate in Westminster and Holyrood, and use roll call records to show that the observed behavior is unlikely to be determined by preferences on any underlying issue dimension. Using a simple variant of the agenda-setting model—in which members of parliament can commit to their voting strategies—we show that the procedural rules for reaching collective decisions in Westminster systems can explain this phenomenon: in the equilibrium, on some bills, members of the opposition vote against the government irrespective of the proposal. Such strategic opposition can reinforce government cohesiveness and have a moderating effect on policy outcomes. We introduce new data from the House of Lords, the Welsh Assembly, and the Northern Ireland Assembly to distinguish our claims from competing accounts of the data.

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Subject: Behavior / Cohesion / Collectives / Data / Democracy / Evidence / Government / Government (Administrative Body) / Incentives / Labor / Labor parties / Legislation / Legislative Bodies / Legislative process / Legislators / Legislatures / Members of Parliament / Nationalist parties / Northern Ireland / Opposition parties / Parliamentary system / Parliaments / Party politics / Political behavior / Political opposition / Political parties / Political science / Preferences / Proposals / Roll Call / Roll-call voting / Scotland / Strategic behaviour / Strategic Voting / United Kingdom / Voting / Voting paradox / Voting patterns / Voting rules / Westminster system