Journal Article

Competing on Good Politicians

NANNICINI, TOMMASO, GALASSO, VINCENZO

2011

Overview

Is electoral competition good for political selection? To address this issue, we introduce a theoretical model where ideological parties select and allocate high-valence (experts) and low-valence (party loyalists) candidates into electoral districts. Voters care about a national policy (e.g., party ideology) and the valence of their district's candidates. High-valence candidates are more costly for the parties to recruit. We show that parties compete by selecting and allocating good politicians to the most contestable districts. Empirical evidence on Italian members of parliament confirms this prediction: politicians with higher ex ante quality, measured by years of schooling, previous market income, and local government experience, are more likely to run in contestable districts. Indeed, despite being different on average, politicians belonging to opposite political coalitions converge to high-quality levels in close electoral races. Furthermore, politicians elected in contestable districts have fewer absences in parliament, due to a selection effect more than to reelection incentives.

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Subject: Absenteeism / Academic Achievement / Candidates / Coalitions / Competition / Decision analysis / Districts / Economic competition / Election districts / Elections / Electoral campaigning / Electoral districts / Evidence / Human Capital / Identity / Ideological influences / Ideology / Incentives / Incumbents / Individual Characteristics / Italian language / Italy / Language ideologies / Leaders / Legislative Bodies / Legislators / Legislatures / Local government / Markets / Nationalist movements / Parliaments / Personnel selection / Political Candidates / Political elections / Political life / Political parties / Political science / Politicians / Politics / Prediction / Primaries & caucuses / Quality standards / Recruitment / Valence / Voters / Voting